Abstract This piece proposes a style of thinking using modal frame correspondence that puts Segerberg's dynamic doxastic logic and 'Dutch' dynamic-epistemic logic for belief change in one setting. While our technical results are elementary, they do suggest new lines of thought.
One could spend much time analyzing these differences, but my aim in this paper is modest. I want to suggest that, for colleagues from modal logic, DDL and DEL fit very well, if we use the method of frame correspondence. This suggestion occurs in van Benthem 2011, but I will pursue it more systematically here. My results are simple technically, but they suggest new perspectives. I start with knowledge in Section 2, exploring frame correspondences for 'public announcement logic' PAL. Many general methodological points can be made at this level, as they are not specific to belief.
Next, I give modal correspondence for logics of belief change in Section 3. In Section 4, I discuss two generalizations: full dynamic-epistemic logic with product update over event models, and an extension of correspondence analysis to neighborhood models, using the DEL treatment in van Benthem & Pacuit 2011. Section 5 lists new general issues coming to light in my analysis, all of them 'to be explored'. Section 6 states the conclusion of this paper, though it will already be clear right here at the start: the two existing styles of modal logic for belief revision live well together, and analyzing their connections actually reveals some interesting issues that will unfold in due course.
Correspondence for information update and knowledge
We start with a phenomenon that is not very interesting in the AGM style, though it becomes wildly exciting when we study it in a constructive setting: update with new hard information that shrinks agents' current ranges of options for the actual situation.
Hard information, knowledge, and public announcement logic
Basic epistemic logic We start by recalling some basics. Standard epistemic logic EL describes semantic information encoded in agents' ranges of uncertainty. The language extends propositional logic with modal operators K i ϕ (i knows that ϕ), for agents i,
and C G ϕ (ϕ is common knowledge in group G). Epistemic models M = (W, {~I} i ∈ I , V)
4 DEL-style logics of belief revision depart from the AGM-format in a number of ways. (i) The content of new beliefs need not be factual, but it can itself consist of complex statements about beliefs.
(ii) What changes in acts of revision is not just beliefs, but crucially also conditional beliefs. (iii) Infinitely many types of triggering event can be analyzed structurally in the logic by mechanisms like 'event models' or 'model-change programs'. (iv) The setting is essentially multi-agent, making, in principle, social acts of belief merge as crucial to the logical system as individual acts of revision (cf. the logics for merging in Girard 2008 , Liu 2011 3 have a set of worlds W, accessibility relations ~i for agents i in some total group I, and a valuation V for proposition letters. Pointed models (M, s) mark a actual world s.
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The key truth condition is that M, s |= K i ϕ iff for all worlds t with s ~i t: M, t |= ϕ.
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Complete logics capturing epistemic reasoning about oneself and others are known (Fagin et al. 1995) . The base system is a minimal modal logic. A restriction to equivalence relations add S5 axioms of positive and negative introspection, while the complete logic of common knowledge can be axiomatized with PDL-techniques.
Information update by elimination Now for the logical dynamics of information flow.
An event !ϕ yielding the information that ϕ is true shrinks the current model to just those worlds that satisfy ϕ. This is the well-known notion of public hard information.
More precisely, for any epistemic model M, world s, and formula ϕ true at s, the new (M|ϕ, s) (M relativized to ϕ at s) is the sub-model of M whose domain is the set {t∈M | M, t |= ϕ}. This mechanism models public communication, but also public observation. There is much more to this dynamics than meets the eye in standard views of 'mere update' with factual formulas. For instance, crucially, truth values of complex epistemic formulas may change after update: agents who did not know that ϕ now do.
Therefore, it makes sense to get clear on the exact dynamic logic behind this.
Public announcement logic
The language of public announcement logic PAL adds action expressions to EL, plus matching modalities, defined by the syntax rules:
Action expressions A: !F
The semantic clause for the dynamic action modality looks ahead between models:
M, s |= <!ϕ>ψ iff M, s |= ϕ and M|P, s |= ψ 5 Further relational conditions on ~i encode special assumptions about agents' powers of observation and introspection: very common is the special case of equivalence relations.
6 As for common knowledge, M, s |= C G ϕ iff for all worlds t that are reachable from s by some finite sequence of arbitrary ~i steps (i∈G): M, t |= ϕ.
7 In what follows, for convenience, we mostly suppress agent indices, and use standard modal notation for the epistemic modality of one accessibility relation R. Also for convenience, we will work mostly with existential modalities instead of universal boxes ☐.
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PAL is axiomatized by any complete logic over static models plus recursion axioms
Intuitively, the final recursion axiom for knowledge captures the essence of getting hard information. We will see in just which sense this is true in our further analysis. grand. In what follows, however, I take a simple approach, investigating the recursion axioms of PAL themselves as postulates, since they have a lot of general appeal. To make this work, we need a suitably abstract setting -close to the models of DDL.
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Update universe and update relations Consider any family M of pointed epistemic models (M, s), viewed as an 'update universe' where model changes can take place.
Possible changes are given as a family of update relations R P (M, s) (N, t) relating pointed models, where the index set P is a subset of M: intuitively, the proposition triggering the update. One can think of the R as recording the action of some update 8 It is a curiously overlooked mismatch that modal logics for philosophical notions are often based on philosophers' intuitions about factual statements only, whereas the logic itself also deals with complex assertions that make good sense, for which the philosophers' intuitions might have to be different. Other imbalances of this sort occur in logics for non-standard consequence relations, and accounts of knowledge proposed in formal epistemology. 9 The setting chosen here is more abstract and flexible than that used in the correspondence analaysis of van Benthem 2011, and it removes some infelicities in that earlier treatment.
5 operation ♥ occurring in the syntax of our language that depends on the proposition P. Remark Throughout, we will fix announced formulas ϕ in contexts <!ϕ>ψ, refraining from varying these in correspondence. Think of distinguished fixed propositions.
Now we are ready to go through the axioms:
Base axiom The axiom <!ϕ>T ↔ ϕ says that, given any model M, the domain of the transition relation R [[ ϕ ] ] is the set of worlds satisfying ϕ in M. In other words, our abstract update action has the truth of ϕ as a necessary and sufficient precondition.
Disjunction axiom
There is no special constraint expressed by the modal formula <!ϕ>(ψ∨χ) ↔ <!ϕ>ψ ∨ <!ϕ>χ, since this law holds for any transition relation.
Negation axiom One direction of this axiom expresses no constraint on the update operation: (ϕ ∧ ¬<!ϕ>ψ) → <!ϕ>¬ψ is valid, given that is equivalent to <!ϕ>T. But
standard correspondence argument that the transition relation is a partial function:
The above comment on interpreting propositions is crucial here: in the argument, we use the singleton set of the pointed model (N, t) as the denotation of ψ in the update universe M.
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Using this observation, we now simplify the original transition relations R P in the update universe to partial functions F P on pointed models. In particular, given any model M with a subset P, we can meaningfully talk about its image F P [M] .
Knowledge axiom So far, we were just doing preliminaries. The heart of the matter is evidently the recursion axiom for knowledge: <!ϕ> ψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ <!ϕ>ψ). The two directions of this clearly express two constraints on the update function -and together, they enforce a well-known notion from modal logic (Segerberg 1971) :
Fact The update function satisfies frame truth of
Proof We do this first proof in a bit of detail, mainly to show how simple correspondence arguments for update functions are. Consider any model M,
First we show that F P is a homomorphism. Suppose that Rst in M, with s, t both in the
and therefore also, (M, s) |= <!ϕ> ψ. By the definition of V(ψ), this implies that R F P (s) F P (t). Next, for the backward clause of being a p-morphism, suppose that R F P (s) u, and now set V(ψ)
= {u}. Then we have (M, s) |= <!ϕ> ψ. It follows from the truth of our axiom that (M, s) |= ϕ ∧ <!ϕ>ψ, and hence there exists a t in M with Rst and F P (t) = u.
■
Collecting all our observations so far, we have the following result:
Theorem An update universe satisfies the substitution-closed principles of PAL iff its transition relations F P are partial p-morphisms defined on the sets P.
Discussion This is not quite the formation of submodels in standard elimination. Here is why. First, having a p-morphism is enough for validity of the PAL axioms, so we found a generalization of the standard semantics that may be of independent interest.
Also, contracting several worlds into one during update occurs naturally in the setting of PAL: cf. van Benthem 2011 on the use of bisimulation contractions in updating.
12 12 If one insists on making the maps one-to-one, this can be done by enriching the modal language, and enforcing one more reduction axiom for public announcement, namely, for the difference modality Dψ saying that ψ holds in a least one different world.
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The base axiom once more Still, the above outputs enforced by our update mechanism are relational subframes, rather than submodels. What about the atomic propositions?
PAL update assumes that these stay the same when a world does not change. Here is how we can think of this. Consider the usual proposition letters of epistemic logic as distinguished atomic propositions. The base axiom tells us that these special propositions have a special behavior: if they hold for an pointed model (M, s), they also hold for any of its update images under a map F P , and vice versa:
This might be the only content to the base axiom: update maps respect distinguished atomic propositions. But we can say a bit more in correspondence style. We assumed that proposition letters ranged over all sets of pointed models in the update universe.
Now introduce special 'context-independent' proposition letters q ranging only over special sets of pointed models, with the property that they only depend on worlds:
Fact An update universe satisfies the base axiom <!ϕ>q ↔ (ϕ ∧ q) for all context-independent q iff the update maps are the identity on worlds:
This is clearly a context-independent predicate. Taking this as V(q), the
Even so, models N occurring in F P -values for pointed models (M, t) with the same M could still differ. We will soon see a further recursion law making this uniform.
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This concludes our discussion of the correspondence content of the PAL axioms.
14 13 For an analogy, think of correspondence theory for intuitionistic logic (Rodenburg 1986 Protocols Update universes also suggest a different setting, that has been proposed in dynamic-epistemic logic for independent reasons. So far, we had that <!ϕ>T ↔ ϕ.
This says that executing an action !ϕ requires truth of the precondition ϕ, but also, whenever ϕ is true, !ϕ can be executed. But in civilized conversation or regimented inquiry, the latter assumption is often untenable. To represent this, 'protocol models' make restrictions on propositions that can be announced or observed. Hoshi 2009 shows how PAL changes in this setting, since the earlier recursion axioms will now be valid only with <!ϕ>T in the place of ϕ on their right-hand sides. This move has many technical repercussions, though the system remains axiomatizable and decidable. From our correspondence perspective, nothing much changes: the only new thing is that the domain of an update map F P will now be a subset of P, but not necessarily all of P.
Our analysis of the modified recursion axioms remains essentially as before.
Language extensions We analyzed update axioms for the epistemic base language.
But PAL also has a complete version for the full epistemic language with common knowledge. The recursion axiom then requires a new notion of 'conditional common 17 There is also the question whether the recursion axiom for conditional common knowledge by itself fixes world elimination as the update rule -but we will consider this issue only with an analogous case in the dynamic logic of belief change.
Other natural operations: link cutting
Update with hard information that ϕ does show variety beyond the above elimination.
In a well-known link-cutting variant, the operation |ϕ performed announces whether ϕ is the case. This means that the domain of worlds stays the same, but all epistemic links get cut between ϕ-worlds and ¬ϕ-worlds in the current model -an operation used by many authors. The changes induced in the PAL axioms are mainly these:
<|ϕ>q ↔ q (this implies the substitution-closed instance <|ϕ>T)
The following result can be proved in the same correspondence style as before: We mainly need to decide what models we will be working with.
Soft information and belief

Doxastic models are structures M = (W, {≤ i } i ∈ I ,V) where the ≤ i are binary comparison
relations ≤ I xy saying that agent i considers x at least as plausible as y. As before, for convenience, we drop agent indices henceforth. These plausibility relations are usually taken to be reflexive and transitive, making the modal base logic S4 -or also connected, like the 'Grove models' of belief revision theory, making the logic S4.3. Such options are important in practice, but they do not affect the analysis to follow.
These models encode varieties of information. While the whole domain represents our current hard information in the earlier sense, the most plausible worlds in the ordering ≤ represent our soft information about the actual world. This soft information is the basis of our beliefs and actions based on these, but it is defeasible: the actual world may lie outside of the most plausible area, and we may learn this as a scenario unfolds.
In this setting, belief is commonly interpreted as truth in all most plausible worlds:
M, s |= Bϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all worlds t that are minimal in the ordering ≤
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But absolute belief does not suffice for most purposes. We need conditional belief:
This point returns with recursion axioms for belief change. From a systematic logical
perspective, we should not analyze changes in beliefs only (the usual practice in belief revision theory), but also changes in conditional belief.
Conditional logic Complete logics for conditional belief can be found in close analogy
with conditional logic based on similarity semantics (Lewis 1973) . One difference is that conditional models usually involve a ternary comparison ordering ≤ z xy: world x is closer to world z then world y. A generalization from binary to ternary relation also makes sense for plausibility semantics of belief, but we forego this here.
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Safe belief While the preceding belief modalities are interesting, it has become clear recently that the plain base modality of plausibility models has independent interest.
M, s |= <≤>ϕ iff there exists a t ≥ s with M, t |= ϕ
The corresponding universal modality offers an interesting doxastic notion in between knowledge and belief. Consider this picture with the actual world s in the middle:
We disregard some modifications of truth clauses needed with infinite models.
19 Absolute belief can be retrieved as the special case of ψ = T.
Another natural generalization are epistemic-doxastic models M = (W, {~i} i∈I , {≤ i, s } i∈I ,V)
allowing for both knowledge update and belief revision. Our methods also work there.
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Kϕ describes what we know: ϕ must be true in all three worlds in the range, less or more plausible than the current one. Bϕ describes beliefs, which have to be true in the right-most world only. Now [≤]ϕ describes our safe beliefs, referring to the actual s plus the right-most world. These cannot be refuted by any future correct observations.
Technically, safe belief can also define the other kinds of belief (Boutilier 1994 ):
with U the universal modality, or in epistemic-doxastic models, a knowledge modality.
Thus, an analysis of belief change might focus on safe belief without losing much.
Dynamic logics of belief change
Now we can write complete logics for belief change. Indeed, there are several systems for this, depending on what kind of new information triggers the change.
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Hard information For hard information, the complete dynamic logic is as follows:
Theorem The logic of conditional belief under public announcements is axiomatized completely by (a) any complete static logic for the model class chosen, (b) the PAL recursion axioms for atomic facts and Boolean operations, (c) an axiom for conditional belief: <!ϕ>B
A similar analysis can be given for safe belief, with a simpler key recursion axiom
Formally, this is just the earlier recursion axiom for a modality . all ϕ-worlds in the current model become better than all ¬ϕ-worlds, while, within those two zones, the old plausibility ordering remains.
Soft information and plausibility change
14 Like for public announcement, we introduce an upgrade modality into our language:
M, s |= <⇑ϕ>ψ iff M⇑ϕ, s |= ψ
The earlier techniques extend. Again there is a complete set of recursion axioms:
Theorem The dynamic logic of lexicographic upgrade is axiomatized by (a) any complete static logic for the model class chosen, (b) the following recursion axioms:
Again, there is also an evident valid recursion axiom for changes in safe belief:
Given the earlier modal definition of absolute and conditional belief in terms of safe belief, one can even derive the preceding recursion axioms from this one. Other belief change policies can be treated in the same style, using the relation transformers of van 
Correspondence for axioms of belief change
As before with knowledge, we can now invert the preceding results and use the key recursion axioms as constraints to determine the space of possible update operations.
For update operations transforming plausibility relations only, leaving domains of models the same, a more complex correspondence proof than earlier ones shows:
Theorem The recursion axioms of the dynamic logic of radical upgrade hold universally for an update operation on a universe of pointed plausibility models iff that operation is in fact radical upgrade.
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It is important to realize what is going on here. AGM-style postulates on changes in beliefs will not fix the relational transformation: we need to constrain the changes in 22 Here as before, we work with the substitution-closed version of the logic. In particular, the atomic case simplifies to just <⇑ϕ>T: radical upgrade is defined everywhere. Proof Suppose that the axiom is valid on a universe of plausibility models. The axiom for atoms tells us in particular that our update function is defined everywhere. Now consider any model (M, s) . From left to right, taking ψ to denote just one world (N, t)
, it follows that (N, t) was either the image of some ϕ-world in M, or s ≤ u in M for some world u mapped to (N, t), i.e., the new ≤-link came from an old one originating in a ¬ϕ-world. This means that each new relational link comes from the set defined by radical upgrade. That in fact all such links occur in the F Pimage of M follows by similar unpacking of the reverse implication of the axiom. ■ Given this last correspondence result, the earlier more complex ones seem less urgent, since safe belief defines absolute and conditional belief. Indeed, AGM-style postulates on 'safe-belief change' might be easier conceptually than those for regular belief. 
Discussion: generality of the analysis
We have seen how recursion laws in constructive logics of belief change can serve as general postulates to constrain, and almost uniquely fix, possible updates. As before, this relates the DDL and DEL approaches to modal logics of belief change, softening a contrast that we started out with. Also as before, issues of generality arise. Are the recursion axioms too specific for belief change postulates? Here we repeat our earlier intuition of 'simulation' between input and output models of the transformation. One might add that a recursive postulate may itself be philosophically attractive as providing the core 'dynamic equation' driving the process of update or revision. Finally, here is an issue more specific to belief. Given the overwhelming variety of belief revision policies, what is the general thrust of correspondence results like ours? We will return to this issue in Section 5, when discussing product update and other general mechanisms replacing separate revision rules by one master rule plus richer input.
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Richer formats as a test case
The style of analysis proposed here works on richer semantic formats for update than modal relational models. In this brief digression, we sketch two examples. These will also raise some issues about the scope and limitations of our earlier analysis.
Event models and product update
While public announcement logic PAL is a good pilot system, its restriction to public information makes it unsuitable for analyzing individual differences in observation and communication. A much richer dynamic-epistemic logic for the latter tasks is true DEL (Gerbrandy 1999 , Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998 . It uses action models E that collect events with attached 'preconditions', with epistemic uncertainty links between events representing agents' observational access to what actually happens. Action models have been used to represent a wide variety of triggers for information change.
Next, by performing product update of an action model E with the current epistemic or doxastic model M one obtains a new updated information model M x E displaying the right information for all agents involved after the event has taken place.
We assume that the reader knows how DEL update works, including its complete set of recursion axioms. We display two of these for later reference -suppressing agent indices as before, and using the letter R to denote the agent's accessibility relation:
This mechanism changes epistemic or doxastic models much more drastically than the earlier world elimination or relation change. In particular, the set {(s, e) | s ∈ M, e ∈ E, M, s |= Pre e }, of worlds in M x E may grow beyond the size of the initial model M.
Theorem The recursion axioms for the dynamic modality <E, e>ϕ of DEL determine product update uniquely modulo p-morphism.
The precise sense in which this fact is true will emerge from the following discussion.
Proof sketch As in our study of PAL, we analyze the impact of the DEL recursion axioms on an update universe of epistemic models with an abstract transition relation for the update for the pointed event model (E, e). The negation axiom of DEL tells us that this is a partial function F E, e . This functionality means that we can think of values 
One update logic to bind them all?
The preceding analysis may still be too piecemeal, ignoring a key innovation of DEL in the area of constructive update logics. An earlier trend had been to define specific model changes for particular kinds of informational event: 'announcements that', link cutting 'announcements whether', or more complex types of private information flow, such as sending a bcc message over email. One gets different complete logics for each case. But DEL changed the game. All relevant structure triggering different updates is put in matching event models E, and the logic for the special case is then a direct instance of the above 'mother logic' of <E, e>ϕ.
In this light, characterizing specific update functions may have some value, but the real logical insight is the general product update mechanism. Is this, then, the best constructive counterpart to a postulational approach to update?
Belief and priority update Similar points can be made about belief revision. One can capture complete logics for specific revision policies, as we have shown. But one can also work at the level of product update with 'plausibility event models', where agents 18 now may think it more plausible that one event occurred rather than another. Update works with the priority rule that strict event plausibility overrides prior plausibility:
The key recursion axiom for the 'mother logic' is given in Baltag & Smets 2006 :
We will not analyze this approach further, but this seems the most general dynamicepistemic counterpart to the postulational approach of dynamic doxastic logic. 
Updating neighborhood models for evidence
It is hard to roam for long in modal logic without finding Krister Segerberg's traces.
Another long-standing interest of his are neighborhood models (Segerberg 1971 Static neighborhood logic An epistemic accessibility relation encodes an agent's current range of worlds after some history of informational events. If we want to retain some of the latter 'evidence', a set of neighborhoods (sets of worlds) does wellwhere we think of the current range as the intersection of all evidence sets. 29 The simplest neighborhood models, and all that we consider here, have just one family N of sets on a domain of worlds. We then interpret an evidence modality as follows:
M, s |= ☐ϕ iff there is a set X in N with M, t |= ϕ for all t∈X
The base logic of this notion is that of a monotone modality that does not necessarily 26 As an illustration, an event model with two signals !ϕ, !¬ϕ, with the first more plausible than the second, generalizes the above radical upgrade ⇑ϕ, that typically also had this overruling character for worlds that satisfied the distinguished triggering proposition ϕ.
27 Here E is the earlier existential modality over all worlds in the model, accessible or not. 
Again, the content of this principle can be determined by a correspondence argument:
Fact An abstract update function on a universe of neighborhood models satisfies the recursion axiom for evidence addition iff each new evidence set is a superset of either some old evidence set or of the set [[ϕ] ].
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A second aspect of a public announcement !ϕ that now gets into its own is removal of the evidence for ¬ϕ. The general new operation -ψ removes all evidence sets from the current family N that are included in [[ψ] ]. Complete recursion axioms are known for removal and the evidence modality, as well as belief, though a considerable extension of the standard static modal base languages over evidence models is required. Here is one such principle, using a notion of evidence conditional on ¬ϕ being true:
30 For instance, the K-axiom ☐ ∧ i ψ i ↔ ∧ i ☐ψ i forces N to be generated from a binary accessibility relation provided we read it with an infinitary conjunction. 31 There are links with modeling beliefs in relational plausibility models here that we ignore.
32 Recursion axioms for new beliefs under evidence addition extend the base language for evidence models to conditional belief in two basic varieties that had not surfaced so far.
33 This is remarkable, since dealing with operations of contraction or removal has long been considered a stumbling block to constructive update logics. The reason why it works in the neighborhood setting after all is the richer model structure one is working on.
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We leave a correspondence analysis of recursion axioms for removal to future work.
Clearly, we have only scratched the surface here, but hopefully, the reader has seen that our analysis still makes sense when the semantic modeling of dynamic epistemic logic undergoes a drastic neighborhood extension of a sort that Krister Segerberg has long ago proposed for dynamic doxastic logic (Segerberg 1995 , Girard 2008 .
Further directions
We have shown how modal correspondence brings together the postulational format of AGM theory and dynamic doxastic logic with the constructive model transformation style of dynamic-epistemic logic. Our technical illustrations were very simple, and we opened up more new problems than closing old ones. Several technical and conceptual issues were already raised in the text. In this section we briefly mention a few more.
Extended semantic formats
We have worked with binary accessibility relations for knowledge and belief. This analysis should be extended to ternary relational models, where plausibility can be world-dependent. Likewise, the analysis needs to be taken to the realm of neighborhood models, a natural finer modeling for belief and evidence. 
Group knowledge and belief
Conclusion
We have shown how the two main logic approaches to belief change, Segerberg's dynamic doxastic logic and the DEL tradition, co-exist in the perspective of modal frame correspondence. Indeed, 'modal logic of belief revision' has two dual aspects that belong together. This much was our contribution to translatability and interaction between frameworks. Our evidence was a set of very simple technical observationsbut around these, many new problems came to light. To me, this agenda of unknowns seems a virtue of the proposed analysis. Krister and I have our work cut out for us.
Finally, a confession is in order. In starting this study, I thought the main beneficiary would be DDL, as it could now import new ideas from the pressure-cooker of DEL.
But as will be clear at various places in the paper, I now feel that a correspondence perspective also raises serious issues about best design for dynamic-epistemic logics, rethinking their striking deviant feature of being non-substitution-closed. And so, I submit that both sides benefit from the style of analysis presented here.
7
